Seventh Circuit Review
Volume 17

Issue 1

Article 5

4-7-2021

"Democracy is Not a Spectator Sport": A Case for Necessary
Judicial Intervention in Elections
Zelpha Williams
Chicago-Kent, zwilliams@kentlaw.iit.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview

Recommended Citation
Zelpha Williams, "Democracy is Not a Spectator Sport": A Case for Necessary Judicial Intervention in
Elections, 17 Seventh Circuit Rev. 89 ().
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/5

This Election Law is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Williams: "Democracy is Not a Spectator Sport": A Case for Necessary Judici

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

“DEMOCRACY IS NOT A SPECTATOR SPORT”: A
CASE FOR NECESSARY JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
IN ELECTIONS
ZELPHA WILLIAMS
Cite as: Zelpha Williams, “Democracy is Not a Spectator Sport”: a Case for
Necessary Judicial Intervention in Elections, 17 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. ___ (2021),
at http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/Documents/Academic Programs/7CR/v17
/Williams.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
Unquestionably, “the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society.”1 As the Supreme Court described in Yick
v. Hopkins over one hundred years ago, “[t]hough not regarded strictly
as a natural right, but as a privilege . . . , nevertheless [the right to
vote] is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative
of all rights.”2 However, the “equal right to vote” is not absolute, and
states are empowered to regulate the voting process and impose
qualifications.3 To prevent voter confusion and maximize voter
turnout, “lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election
rules on the eve of an election.”4 Although protecting against voter
 J.D. candidate, May 2022, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Ed.M., Boston University, September 2019; B.A. in Political Science,
Johns Hopkins University, May 2017.
1
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).
2
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
3
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (quoting Evans v. Cornman,
398 U.S. 419, 425 (1970)).
4
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207
(2020); see Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006).
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disenfranchisement by preventing judicial changes too near an election
is a worthy goal under ordinary circumstances, the same standard
should not be applied during unprecedented times, such as during a
once-in-a-century global pandemic, natural disaster, or other such
catastrophic event.
This note will evaluate the flawed decision reached by the
Seventh Circuit. First, it will discuss the legal background of Supreme
Court precedent regarding judicial changes to election procedures
before an election. Next, it will discuss the procedural history of this
particular case, from its original legal challenge in a Wisconsin federal
district court, all the way up to the Supreme Court, back to the district
court, and eventually to the final Seventh Circuit opinion, which is the
subject of this note. Finally, it will discuss the flaws in the Seventh
Circuit’s per curiam opinion and the result it should have reached
instead, as articulated by Justice Rovner in dissent.
Precedent Regarding Changes to Federal Elections
In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Supreme Court outlined the
framework that must be used to evaluate challenges to a state’s
election laws:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of
the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.
It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed
by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only
determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those
interests; it also must consider the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.
Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in
a position to decide whether the challenged provision is
unconstitutional.5
5

460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
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On April 24, 1980, John Anderson announced his candidacy for
President of the United States, running as an independent candidate.6
His supporters then gathered the requisite signatures of registered
voters, filed required documentation, and paid filing fees, thereby
meeting the substantive requirements to place his name on the ballot in
all states as well as the District of Colombia. 7 However, by the date of
his announcement, the statutory deadline for filing a statement of
candidacy had already passed in Ohio and several other states. 8 The
parties did not dispute the facts: Anderson’s supporters provided a
nominating petition containing about 14,500 signatures and a
statement of candidacy to the Ohio Secretary of State on May 16,
1980—which would have entitled Anderson to a place on the ballot if
filed by March 20, 1980.9 Given the tardiness of the filing, the
Secretary of State refused to accept the petition; accordingly, Anderson
and three voters (two registered in Ohio and one in New Jersey)
challenged the constitutionality of Ohio’s filing deadline. 10 The case
presented the question of “whether Ohio’s early filing deadline placed
an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of
Anderson’s supporters.”11
The District Court ordered the Secretary of State to list
Anderson’s name on the ballot for the general election and granted the
petitioners’ motion for summary judgment.12 The Secretary of State
appealed, but did not seek a stay of the district court’s order.13 Because
the request for expedited review was unsuccessful, both in the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court, the election occurred while the appeal
was pending.14 The court of appeals reversed, holding “that Ohio’s
6

Id. at 782.
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 782–83.
11
Id. at 782.
12
Id. at 783.
13
Id.
14
Id. (“In Ohio Anderson received 254,472 votes, or 5.9 percent of the votes
cast; nationally, he received 5,720,060 votes or approximately 6.6 percent of the
total.”).
7

91

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,

3

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

early deadline ‘ensures that voters making the important choice of
their next president have the opportunity for a careful look at the
candidates, a chance to see how they withstand the close scrutiny of a
political campaign.’”15
Applying the balancing framework, the Court noted the
“significant” restriction Ohio’s filing deadline imposed on the national
electoral process.16 The Court then evaluated the three interests Ohio
alleged it furthered through its early filing deadline for independent
Presidential candidates: “voter education, equal treatment for partisan
and independent candidates, and political stability.”17 However, none
of these interests could justify the burden imposed by the early filing
deadline.18 The Court was concerned with the interests of voters who
wished to associate collectively in support of Anderson: “[u]nder any
realistic appraisal, the ‘extent and nature’ of the burdens Ohio has
placed on the voters’ freedom of choice and freedom of association, in
an election of nationwide importance, unquestionably outweigh the
State’s minimal interest in imposing a March deadline.”19
Similarly, in Burdick v. Takushi, the Court applied the Anderson
balancing test to a constitutional challenge of Hawaii’s voting laws. 20
In 1986, only one candidate filed paperwork to run for a Hawaii House
of Representative seat in representing the petitioner’s district; the
petitioner was registered to vote in the city and county of Honolulu.21
After inquiring about Hawaii’s write-in voting policy, the Hawaii
Attorney General’s Office informed petitioner that Hawaii’s election
laws had no write-in voting provision.22 Petitioner then brought suit,
alleging the write-in prohibition unconstitutionally infringed upon his
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because he wanted to vote for
candidates who had not filed nominating papers in the primary and
15

Id. at 784–86.
Id. at 795.
17
Id. at 796.
18
Id. at 806.
19
Id.
20
504 U.S. 428, 428 (1992).
21
Id. at 430.
22
Id.
16
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general elections.23 The United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii entered a preliminary injunction to allow for casting of writein votes and require their tallying in the November 1986 election,
finding the write-in voting ban violated the petitioner’s rights of
expression and association under the First Amendment.24
The court of appeals entered a stay and vacated the district court’s
judgment, finding “consideration of the federal constitutional question
raised by petitioner was premature because ‘neither the plain language
of Hawaii statutes nor any definitive judicial interpretation of those
statutes establishes that the Hawaii legislature has enacted a ban on
write-in voting’” and instructed the district court to abstain, pending a
decision from state courts about whether Hawaii’s election laws
permitted write-in voting.25 The district court then certified three
questions to Hawaii’s Supreme Court; Hawaii’s Supreme Court held
Hawaii’s election laws—which were consistent with Hawaii’s
constitution—prohibited write-in voting.26 Then, the district court
granted the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and an
injunction, this time entering a stay pending appeal. 27 The Ninth
Circuit found Hawaii did not have to enable write-in voting, reversing
the decision of the district court. 28
Under the Anderson standard, “the rigorousness of our inquiry
into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.”29 Accordingly, “‘severe’ restrictions, . . . must be
‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’
But when a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth

23

Id.
Id. at 430–31.
25
Id. at 431.
26
Id. at 431–32.
27
Id. at 432.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 434.
24
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Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests
are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” 30
Under Hawaii’s election laws, a candidate was required to
participate in its “open primary, ‘in which all registered voters may
choose in which party primary to vote,’” in order to receive a place on
the November general election ballot. 31 Hawaii’s election provided
easy access to the ballot in advance of the registration deadline, two
months before the primary election. 32 As a result, only voters who wait
until the days preceding the primary election to select a candidate
experience any burden on their freedom of choice and association. 33
Under the Anderson standard for evaluating how much a state law
burdens the right to vote, Hawaii’s write-in restriction provides only a
limited burden.34
In light of the limited burden, the state did not need to provide a
compelling interest to outweigh the petitioner’s interests.35 Hawaii’s
asserted interests in “avoid[ing] the possibility of unrestrained
factionalism at the general election”36 and “guard[ing] against ‘party
raiding’” in the primary sufficiently outweighed the limited burden
placed on voters.37 When a state’s ballot-access laws impose only
reasonable burdens on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as was
the case in Burdick, “a prohibition on write-in voting will be
presumptively valid, since any burden on the right to vote for the
candidate of one’s choice will be light and normally will be
counterbalanced by the very state interests supporting the ballot access
scheme.”38

30

Id. (internal citations omitted); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788

(1983).
31

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 435.
Id. at 436.
33
Id. at 436–37.
34
Id. at 438–39.
35
Id. at 439.
36
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
37
Id. at 439–40.
38
Id. at 441.
32
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Purcell v. Gonzalez established the warning to federal judges not
to intervene too near an election. 39 A two-judge motion panel from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entered an interlocutory injunction
from which county officials and the State of Arizona sought relief. 40 In
2004, voters in Arizona approved Proposition 200 which required
voters to provide proof of citizenship at the time of voter registration
and present identification when voting in an attempt to prevent voter
fraud.41 Because Arizona was a covered jurisdiction under Section
Five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Arizona was required to receive
preclearance from the United States Attorney General or the District
Court for the District of Columbia before adopting “any new voting
‘standard, practice, or procedure’ . . . to ensure its new voting policy
did ‘not have the purpose [or] effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color.’”42 On May 5, 2005, the United
States Attorney General precleared Proposition 200. 43
In May of 2006, residents of Arizona, Indian tribes, and various
community organizations challenged the identification requirements
enacted under Proposition 200. 44 Without issuing findings of facts or
conclusions of law, the district court denied plaintiffs’ request for a
preliminary injunction on September 11, 2006. 45 Plaintiffs appealed,
and the briefing schedule from the Court of Appeals was set to
conclude on November 21—two weeks after the election on
November 7.46 Accordingly, plaintiffs sought an injunction pending
appeal so the Court of Appeals assigned a two-judge
motions/screening panel to hear the matter; written responses from the
State and county officials were received but the panel did not hold oral
arguments.47 The panel issued an order on October 5—consisting of
39

549 U.S. 1 (2006).
Id. at 2.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973c); see also Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S.
461, 461–62 (2003).
43
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 3.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
40
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just four sentences and no rationale—enjoining enforcement of
Proposition 200 until the conclusion of the appeal, following full
briefing.48 Four days later—again with no explanation—the Court of
Appeals denied a motion for reconsideration. 49
The District Court finally issued findings of fact and conclusions
of law on October 12, concluding that despite an ability to demonstrate
“a possibility of success on the merits of some of their arguments . . .
the Court cannot say that at this stage [the plaintiffs] have shown a
strong likelihood.”50 Consequently, the District Court denied the
injunction.51
The Supreme Court acknowledged the state’s compelling interest
in preventing voter fraud and the “plaintiffs’ strong interest in
exercising the ‘fundamental political right’ to vote.” 52 While the
effects of Proposition 200 were still debated, the Court noted that the
potential for any qualified voter to be denied a vote “would caution
any district judge to give careful consideration to the plaintiffs’
challenges.”53 Required considerations included harm that would
result from lack of action, institutional procedures, and electionspecific concerns: “Court orders affecting elections, especially
conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and
consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election
draws closer, that risk will increase.”54 However, those
considerations—including the delay if en banc review was sought—
were not controlling here.55 Procedurally, the court of appeals was
required to give deference to the district court; consequently, it erred
by failing to do so.56 The Court vacated the order of the court of

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
51
Id. at 4.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 4–5.
55
Id. at 5.
56
Id.
49
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appeals because, without an explanation, it failed to indicate how the
ruling and findings of the district court were incorrect.57
The idea that “lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the
election rules on the eve of an election” comes from action taken in
Purcell.58 However, the Court did not go so far as to say that outright
in Purcell and did not even use the word “ordinarily.” Rather, the
Court provided a caution about not confusing voters as elections draw
near. Ultimately, “[g]iven the imminence of the election and the
inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes, [the Court’s] action
today shall of necessity allow the election to proceed without an
injunction suspending the voter identification rules.” 59
The Supreme Court then acted in accordance with the Purcell
caution. In May 2011, the Wisconsin legislature enacted 2011
Wisconsin Act 23, which required residents to present photo
identification to vote.60 Voters and advocacy organizations challenged
the law under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights
Act.61 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin permanently enjoined enforcement of the photo
identification requirements in April of 2014. 62 Next, in September of
2014, the Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction issued by the district
court, allowed Wisconsin to enforce the law in its upcoming
elections.63 However, the Supreme Court granted the application to
vacate the Seventh Circuit’s stay in October of 2014 in a two-sentence
order.64 Justice Alito, in dissent, acknowledged the “colorable basis for
the Court's decision due to the proximity of the upcoming general
election”65—even though the application came almost two months in
advance of the election.
57

Id.
See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205,
1207 (2020).
59
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2006).
60
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 842 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 880.
63
Frank v. Walker, 766 F.3d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
64
Frank v. Walker, 574 U.S. 929 (2014).
65
Id.
58
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Recent Supreme Court Action in Election Cases
The Supreme Court issued a shadow docket opinion in
Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee,
reversing a pandemic-related mail-in ballot deadline extension for
Wisconsin’s April 2020 primary election. 66 That decision is discussed
in more detail in the section detailing the history of this case.
In June 2020, the Fifth Circuit stayed “a sweeping preliminary
injunction that require[d] state officials, inter alia, to distribute mail-in
ballots to any eligible voter who want[ed] one,” reasoning that “the
spread of the [COVID-19] Virus ha[d] not given “unelected federal
jud[ges]” a roving commission to rewrite state election codes.”67 The
Supreme Court—without any explanation—denied an application to
vacate the stay in Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott.68
Several lawsuits challenged the constitutionality of a Florida law
requiring citizens to pay to vote as it applies to convicted felons.69 In
an order consolidating the cases and setting out findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida entered a permanent injunction and directed the
entry of judgement, holding Florida “can condition voting on payment
of fines and restitution that a person is able to pay
but cannot condition voting on payment of amounts a person is unable
to pay or on payment of taxes, even those labeled fees or costs.”70 The
decision established “administrative procedures that comport[ed] with
the Constitution and [were] less burdensome, on both the State and the
citizens, than those the State [was] currently using to administer the
unconstitutional pay-to-vote system.”71 In July, the Eleventh Circuit
granted the defendants’ petition for a hearing en banc and stayed the

66

140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020).
Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2020).
68
140 S. Ct. 2015 (2020).
69
Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1203 (N.D. Fla. 2020).
70
Id. at 1203–05.
71
Id. at 1205.
67
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permanent injunction pending appeal. 72 Again, without explanation,
the Supreme Court denied the application to vacate the stay. 73
On September 18, 2020, the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction and suspended the witness requirement for registered
absentee voters during the November 2020 election. 74 The Supreme
Court, without explaining its reasoning, stayed the district court’s
order but excepted any ballots cast prior to issuance of the Court’s
order and received within two days from compliance with the witness
requirement.75 For “two alternative and independent reasons,” Justice
Kavanaugh concurred with the opinion of the Court: “[f]irst, the
Constitution ‘principally entrusts the safety and the health of the
people to the politically accountable officials of the States’” and,
“[s]econd, for many years, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that
federal courts ordinarily should not alter state election rules in the
period close to an election.”76
On September 30, 2020, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama found plaintiffs were entitled to
injunctive relief preventing enforcement of Alabama’s witness
requirement, photo identification requirement, and ban on curbside
voting during the November 2020 election in light of the pandemic. 77
In late October (after the disposition of the Seventh Circuit case
discussed herein), the Court stayed the district court order granting a
permanent injunction, again without explanation of its reasoning.78

72

McCoy v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003-AA, 2020 WL 4012843 (11th Cir.
July 1, 2020).
73
Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600 (2020).
74
Middleton v. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 261, 307 (D.S.C. 2020).
75
Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2020).
76
Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
77
People First of Alabama v. Merrill, 491 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1180 (N.D. Ala.
2020).
78
Merrill v. People First of Alabama, 141 S. Ct. 25 (2020).
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THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 IN WISCONSIN
As of September 21, 2020, when the district court issued its
opinion, the effects of the pandemic within Wisconsin intensified.
Daily COVID-19 case counts in Wisconsin had doubled, jumping
from 1,004 to over 2,000 cases reported just one week later, on
September 17.79 Wisconsin broke multiple case records in September,
in advance of flu season.80 The district court acknowledged the
unknown nature of the COVID-19 pandemic’s progression, but “the
unrebutted public health evidence in the record demonstrates that
COVID-19 will continue to persist, and may worsen, through
November.”81 Given the recent outbreak of cases among college
students, concerns about infections from college campuses spreading
to the community, and the impending flu season, the public health
landscape in Wisconsin threatened to worsen. 82
By October, conditions in Wisconsin worsened, and the
Governor of Wisconsin declared a public health emergency.83 On
October 6, Wisconsin reported a seven-day average of 2,346 new
COVID-19 cases.84 The White House Coronavirus Task Force
79

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776, 792 (W.D.
Wis. 2020); see WPR Staff, Wisconsin Sets New Daily Record with 2,034
Coronavirus Cases Reported Thursday, WIS. PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-sets-new-daily-record-2-034-coronavirus-casesreported-thursday.
80
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 488 F. Supp. 3d at 793.
81
Id.
82
Id.; see David Wahlberg, UW-Madison Threatens ‘More Drastic Action’ as
Experts Say COVID-19 Outbreak Impacting Broader Community, WIS. STATE
JOURNAL (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/education/university/uw-madison-threatensmore-drastic-action-as-experts-say-covid-19-outbreak-impacting-broadercommunity/article_dd00c9cc-5dc9-5924-99ca-40c94a0f6738.html.
83
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 650 (7th Cir. 2020);
Wis. Exec. Order No. 90 (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://evers.wi.gov/Pages/Newsroom/Executive-Orders.aspx.
84
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 650; Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs.,
COVID-19: Wisconsin Cases, https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid19/cases.htm#confirmed (as of October 6, 2020).
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designated Wisconsin as a “red zone” for COVID-19 cases and
detailed a “rapid worsening of the epidemic” in Wisconsin in a draft
report issued the week before the Seventh Circuit’s opinion. 85
According to the Coronavirus Task Force, almost half of all Wisconsin
counties had high levels of community transmission. 86 Wisconsin
ranked third-highest in the nation for cases per 100,000 people and
seventh-highest in positive test rates. 87 Wisconsin reached record-high
hospitalization rates as hospitals in the northeast of the state neared
capacity.88 Wisconsin opened a field hospital in mid-October, which it
announced earlier in the month, to combat the shortage of available
hospital facilities.89 Wisconsin experienced new and worsening
conditions in the fall of 2020: “While the facility was never needed for
patients over the spring and summer of 2020, rising hospitalization
rates across the state in the fall have led to its opening.”90

85

Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 650 (internal quotations omitted).
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 650; Coronavirus Task Force, State
Report—Wisconsin, at 1, WASHINGTON POST, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/context/white-house-coronavirus-task-force-reportwarnsof-high-wisconsin-covid-19-spread-in-wisconsin/e5f16345-fcb4-4524-975e8011379ef0da/ (Sept. 27, 2020).
87
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 650.
88
Id.; Mary Spicuzza, et al., Some Hospitals Forced to Wait-List or Transfer
Patients as Wisconsin’s Coronavirus Surge Continues, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
SENTINEL, https:// www.jsonline.com/story/news/2020/09/30/wisconsin-hospitalswait-list-patients-covid-19-surge-coronavirus-greenbay-fox-valleywausau/3578202001/ (Sept. 30, 2020).
89
Wisconsin Department of Health Services, COVID-19: Alternate Care
Facility at State Fair Park, https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-19/alternate-carefacility.htm (March 19, 2021); see Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 650; Mary
Spicuzza and Molly Beck, Wisconsin to Open Field Hospital at State Fair Park on
October 14 as Surge in Coronavirus Patients Continues in Fox Valley, Green
Bay, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, https://www.jsonline.com/
story/news/local/wisconsin/2020/10/07/wisconsin-preparing-open-alternate-carefacility-state-fair-park-state-continues-face-surge-covid-1/5909769002/ (October 7,
2020).
90
Wisconsin Department of Health Services, COVID-19: Alternate Care
Facility at State Fair Park, https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-19/alternate-carefacility.htm (March 19, 2021).
86
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Under this framework, during these unprecedented times, the
Purcell guidance was inapplicable. Because this was not an ordinary
circumstance, the Supreme Court’s warning to federal judges to not
“ordinarily” make changes to federal election laws did not apply. The
situation in Wisconsin approaching the November election—in terms
of both public health and unprecedented societal shutdowns—was not
ordinary because the public health context Wisconsin experienced
would normally not be conceivable.
HISTORY OF THIS CASE
What Happened Below in Preceding Litigation
In three consolidated cases spanning throughout the last two
weeks of March 2020, Plaintiffs—Democratic National Committee
(DNC), Democratic Party of Wisconsin, and individual voters—filed
lawsuits challenging a variety of statutory requirements for the April 7,
2020, primary election in light of concerns over COVID-19.91
Plaintiffs alleged violations of the fundamental right to vote, due
process, and equal protection and sought to prevent enforcement of
both statutory identification requirements and deadlines for electronic,
mail-in, and absentee ballot receipt. 92 The district court allowed the
Wisconsin Legislature and Republican Party of Wisconsin to intervene
as defendants and consolidated the cases. 93 Plaintiffs moved for
reconsideration as well as a preliminary injunction “seeking
postponement of election, extension of deadline for receipt of absentee
ballots, and suspension of witness signature requirement on absentee
ballots.”94

91

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 957 (W.D.
Wis. 2020).
92
Id. at 952.
93
Id.; see Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 447 F. Supp. 3d 757 (W.D.
Wis. 2020); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 20-CV-249-WMC, 2020
WL 1505640 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 2020).
94
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 451 F. Supp. 3d at 957.
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To the credit of the Western District of Wisconsin, Judge Conley
seriously considered the implications of the pandemic:
Contrary to the view of at least a dozen other states, as well
as the consensus of medical experts across the country as to
the gathering of large groups of people, the State of
Wisconsin appears determined to proceed with an in-person
election on April 7, 2020. In the weeks leading up to the
election, the extent of the risk of holding that election has
become increasingly clear, and Wisconsin voters have begun
to flock to the absentee ballot option in record numbers. As a
result, state election officials are confronting a huge backlog
in requests for absentee ballots made online, by mail or in
person, including an unprecedented number of questions
regarding how to satisfy certain registration requirements,
properly request an absentee ballot, and return a properly
completed absentee ballot in time to be considered for the
April 7 election. On top of the burdens this influx has created
for the Wisconsin Election Commission, its Administrator,
staff and local municipalities in the days leading up to the
election, that same group has been improvising in real time a
method to proceed safely and effectively with in-person
voting in the face of increasing COVID-19 risks, loss of poll
workers due to age, fears or sickness, the resulting
consolidation of polling locations, and inadequate
resources.95
Acknowledging the three potential consequential outcomes the court
could foresee resulting from the election, the court nonetheless
maintained “the only role of a federal district court is to take steps that
help avoid the impingement on citizens’ rights to exercise their voting
franchise as protected by the United States Constitution and federal
statutes.”96 Accordingly, the court attempted to do just that,
95

Id.
Id. at 958 (“[T]he three most likely consequences of proceeding with the
election on this basis are (1) a dramatic shortfall in the number of voters on election
96
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“understanding that a consequence of these measures may be to further
the public health crisis in this State.”97 However, as the district court
aptly noted, “[u]nfortunately, that is beyond the power of this court to
control.”98
As the court explained, the same standard is applied to determine
whether a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is
appropriate: (1) irreparable harm will be suffered if no relief is
granted, (2) inadequate remedies exist at law, (3) the plaintiff has a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, and (4) the balance of
equities weighs in favor of the moving party. 99
The court granted the plaintiffs’ motions in part.100 However, the
court rejected the plaintiff’s request to delay the April 7, 2020, election
because it could not “say with confidence that the state's asserted
interests – although strong – [were] so compelling as to overcome the
severe burdens that voters are sure to face in the upcoming
election.”101 While the plaintiffs “demonstrated at
least some likelihood of success on the merits of this claim,” plaintiffs
needed to “further show that the balance of equities support[ed] their
requested relief.”102 Importantly, “none of the cases cited by plaintiffs
authorize what plaintiffs [asked] the court to do in this circumstance:
delay the date of an impending, state-wide election.”103 The court
further found that the existing proof of identification requirement did
not impose an undue burden on the right to vote and denied plaintiffs’
request for relief with respect to the identification requirement. 104 With
day as compared to recent primaries, even after accounting for the impressive
increase in absentee voters, (2) a dramatic increase in the risk of cross-contamination
of the coronavirus among in-person voters, poll workers and, ultimately, the general
population in the State, or (3) a failure to achieve sufficient in-person voting to have
a meaningful election and an increase in the spread of COVID-19.”).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 968–69.
100
Id. at 952.
101
Id. at 972.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 974.
104
Id. at 981.
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regard to the plaintiffs’ requests for an extension of the mail-in
registration deadline and relief from proof of residence provision, both
were denied.105 Given the timeline, the extension would only reopen
the registration deadline for one day so the administrative burdens
would outweigh any potential benefit. 106 Relief from the requirement
to submit proof of residence with a mailed registration application was
denied as moot because the mail-in registration deadline had passed. 107
The district court provided preliminary relief: (1) enjoining the
statutory requirement that absentee ballots be received by 8pm on
election day in order to be counted and extending the deadline until
April 13, 2020, at 4pm; (2) enjoining enforcement of the statutory
requirement that requests for absentee ballots must be received by
April 2, 2020, and extending the deadline for requests until April 3,
2020 at 5pm; and (3) enjoining enforcement of the statutory
requirement to obtain witness certification—for otherwise valid
ballots—when voters attested to their inability to safely obtain
certification despite reasonable efforts to do so.108
Next, a three-judge panel from the Seventh Circuit reviewed the
district court’s opinion and issued an opinion on April 3, 2020.109 First,
the Seventh Circuit denied the Plaintiffs’ motions for a stay of the
district court’s order regarding ballot request and receipt deadlines.110
Second, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motions for a stay “as to that
portion of the district court’s order that enjoins the enforcement
of Wis. Stat. § 6.87(2) for absentee voters who provide a written
affirmation or other statement that they were unable to safely obtain a
witness certification despite reasonable efforts to do so” because it
determined “the district court did not give adequate consideration to
the state’s interests in suspending this requirement,” given the
importance of preserving the integrity of elections and preventing
105

Id. at 981–82.
Id.
107
Id. at 982.
108
Id. at 959.
109
Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann, No. 20-1538, 2020 WL
3619499 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020).
110
Id. at *1.
106

105

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,

17

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

voter fraud.111 The Seventh Circuit was “concerned with the
overbreadth of the district court’s order, which categorically
eliminate[d] the witness requirement applicable to absentee ballots and
[gave] no effect to the state’s substantial interest in combatting voter
fraud.”112 Finally, it concluded the Legislature had standing to
appeal.113 “Notably, no aspect of theses [sic] appeals challenge[d] the
district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ request to enjoin live voting
on April 7.”114
Then, in a per curiam order issued on April 6, the Supreme Court
stayed the preliminary injunction of the district court “to the extent it
require[d] the State to count absentee ballots postmarked after April 7,
2020.”115 The Court indicated that Wisconsin’s decision to hold the
April 7 election as scheduled was not the subject of review; rather, the
Court considered “a narrow, technical question about the absentee
ballot process.”116 The Court noted agreement regarding the extension
of the deadline for municipal clerks to receive absentee ballots from
April 7 to April 13; the deadline for clerk receipt was not questioned in
the Supreme Court.117 Rather, “[t]he sole question before the Court is
whether absentee ballots now must be mailed and postmarked by
election day, Tuesday, April 7, as state law would necessarily require,
or instead may be mailed and postmarked after election day, so long as
they are received by Monday, April 13.”118 Importantly, the Court
repeatedly emphasized the Plaintiffs did not ask the district court to
count ballots mailed and postmarked after April 7; just five days
before the election, the district court “unilaterally” ordered those
ballots still be counted so long as received by the April 13 deadline. 119

111

Id. at *2.
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at *1.
115
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205,
1206 (2020).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 1206–07.
112
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However, the Court declared that “[e]xtending the date by which
ballots may be cast by voters—not just received by the municipal
clerks but cast by voters—for an additional six days after the
scheduled election day fundamentally alters the nature of the
election.”120 Furthermore, the opinion stated “[t]his Court has
repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not
alter the election rules on the eve of an election”121 and by altering
these election rules, the district court “contravened this Court's
precedents and erred by ordering such relief.”122
Moreover, the Court emphasized that “unusual nature” of the
district court order at issue was evidenced by the need for an order that
followed enjoining release of election results to the public for six days
following the election.123 The Court indicated that, “[i]n doing so, the
District Court in essence enjoined nonparties to this lawsuit.”124
Further, the Court seriously doubted the success of the attempt to
prevent public disclosure of the results.125 Regardless, the Court
reasoned a disclosure of any information during that six-day window
“would gravely affect the integrity of the election process.”126 But the
Court remarked “all of that further underscore[d] the wisdom of
the Purcell principle, which seeks to avoid this kind of judicially
created confusion.”127
Notably, the Supreme Court issued its decision reversing the
district court’s decision and staying the injunction in part on the day
before the election. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice
Ginsburg and joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
acknowledged: “[t]he District Court, acting in view of the dramatically
evolving COVID-19 pandemic, entered a preliminary injunction to
safeguard the availability of absentee voting in Wisconsin's spring
120

Id. at 1207 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006); Frank v. Walker, 574
U.S. 929 (2014); Veasey v. Perry, 135 S.Ct. 9 (2014)).
122
Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207.
123
Id. at 1207.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
121
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election. This Court now intervene[d] at the eleventh hour to prevent
voters who have timely requested absentee ballots from casting their
votes.”128 The dissenters “would not [have] disturb[ed] the District
Court's disposition, which the Seventh Circuit allowed to stand.” 129
Despite the Purcell caution to avoid confusing voters, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision—which, as the dissent
poignantly points out, would have allowed more citizens to vote—just
the day before the election. The Court, responding to the dissent’s
concerns regarding the late date of intervention, stated it would prefer
not to intervene at this time, “but when a lower court intervenes and
alters the election rules so close to the election date, our precedents
indicate that this Court, as appropriate, should correct that error.” 130
What Happened Previously at This Stage of the Case
Concerned about the upcoming November general election,
individuals and organizations in the four consolidated cases moved for
preliminary injunctive relief; the WEC, Republican National
Committee, and the Republican Party of Wisconsin opposed the
motions. Defendants and intervening defendants also moved to
dismiss three of the four cases. 131 After full briefing on the motions,
presentation of evidence, and a hearing on August 5, 2020, the District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin largely rejected
defendants’ motions to dismiss.132
The District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin entered a
preliminary injunction which (1) extended the deadline for mail-in and
online voter registration under the statute by one week; (2) directed the
Wisconsin Election Commission (WEC) to include language
explaining the “indefinitely confined” exception “does not require
permanent or total inability to travel outside of the residence” on the
128

Id. at 1208 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Id.
130
Id. at 1207.
131
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776, 783 (W.D.
Wis. 2020).
132
Id. at 783–84.
129
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MyVote and WisVote websites as well as any additional materials that
might include the exception; (3) extended the Wisconsin statutory
deadline for absentee ballot receipt until November 9, 2020, but
required the ballots be postmarked or mailed by or on election day on
November 3, 2020; (4) enjoined a Wisconsin statute which limited
absentee ballot delivery only to mail for domestic civilian voters,
allowing voters whose timely absentee ballot request was approved
but had not received their mailed ballot online access or emailed
replacement ballots from October 22 to October 29, 2020; and (5)
enjoined a Wisconsin statute, allowing election officials to reside in
other counties for the November 2020 election. 133
The district court, however, recognizing the likelihood of an
appeal, stayed the order for one week and “join[ed] the WEC in urging
especially new Wisconsin voters to register by mail on or before
October 14, 2020, and all voters to do so by absentee ballot as soon as
possible.”134 Therefore, the court stated that unless finally upheld on
appeal, no voter could rely on any deadline extension for mail-in or
electronic registration nor receipt of absentee ballots. 135
On September 29, 2020, the Seventh Circuit issued an order
denying the motions for a stay based on its belief that Wisconsin’s
legislature was not authorized to represent the interest of the state of
Wisconsin in defending its statutes.136 In accordance with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission, a state legislature has Article III standing to
litigate in federal court “when it seeks to vindicate a uniquely
legislative interest.”137 Because the constitutional validity of a law
does not concern a legislative interest, a state legislature is not
permitted to litigate in federal court regarding the validity of a state
statute.138 However, Wis. Stat. §803.09(2m) provides:
133

Id. at 784 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
135
Id.
136
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2020).
137
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 976 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2020)
(citing Ariz. Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787).
138
Id.; Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019).
134
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When a party to an action challenges in state or federal court
the constitutionality of a statute, facially or as applied,
challenges a statute as violating or preempted by federal law,
or otherwise challenges the construction or validity of a
statute, as part of a claim or affirmative defense, the
assembly, the senate, and the legislature may intervene . . . at
any time in the action as a matter of right by serving a motion
upon the parties . . . .139
In an earlier stage of the case, the Seventh Circuit determined that
§803.09(2m) allowed the Wisconsin Legislature (“Legislature”) to act
in a representative capacity—with the same rights as the Attorney
General of Wisconsin.140 However, three months after the Seventh
Circuit reached this conclusion, “the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that this statute, if taken as broadly as its language implies, violates the
state’s constitution, which commits to the executive branch of
government the protection of the state’s interest in litigation.”141
Upon request for reconsideration, on October 2, the Seventh
Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
“whether, under Wis. Stat. §803.09(2m), the State Legislature has the
authority to represent the State of Wisconsin’s interest in the validity
of state laws.”142 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, looking to the plain
language of the statute as well as its context, answered that the
Legislature indeed has that power. 143

139

Democratic Nat’l Comm., 976 F.3d at 767; Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m) (West).
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 976 F.3d at 767 (citing Democratic Nat’l Comm.
v. Bostelmann, 2020 WL 3619499 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020)).
141
Id. (citing Service Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 393 Wis.2d 38, 69–81
(2020)).
142
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d at 641.
143
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 949 N.W.2d 423, 424 (Wis. 2020).
140
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WHAT THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECIDED
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit granted the petition for
reconsideration and evaluated the merits of the Legislature’s
motion.144 Only the Legislature sought reconsideration, so the court’s
order did not address the arguments of the other interveners.145 The
Legislature argued in support of a stay that (1) federal courts should
not change election rules so close to the election date and (2) elected
officials—rather than judges—should determine when a devastating
event such as a pandemic justifies changing otherwise valid rules. 146
Circuit Judges Easterbrook, Rovner, and St. Eve heard the appeal.
Agreeing with both of these arguments, the court’s per curiam opinion
granted the stay in light of the factors for a stay of appeal discussed in
Nken v. Holder—the “traditional” standard for a stay of appeal: “(1)
whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely
to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies.”147
The Seventh Circuit explained that “[f]or many years the Supreme
Court has insisted that federal courts not change electoral rules close
to an election date” and pointed to the earlier phase of this case and
Frank in support.148 It reasoned that if the orders in those instances
were too late, then the district court’s order here—issued six weeks
before the election but less than four weeks before the first deadline it
altered—must also be too late.149 The Seventh Circuit remarked “it is
not possible to describe COVID-19 as a last-minute event” because the
pandemic was declared by the World Health Organization seven
144

Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 641.
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.; Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
148
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 641; see Republican Nat’l Comm. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020); Frank v. Walker, 574 U.S.
929 (2014).
149
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 641–42.
145
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months before its opinion and Wisconsin held two elections during
that time.150
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit, looking to Supreme Court
precedent, explained that changing electoral procedures remains a
legislative task even amidst a pandemic. 151 The court reasoned the
pandemic did not justify changes for this election because “[v]oters
have had many months since March to register or obtain absentee
ballots; reading the Constitution to extend deadlines near the election
is difficult to justify when the voters have had a long time to cast
ballots while preserving social distancing.”152 Because state law
allows for alternatives to in-person voting on election day, the Seventh
Circuit disagreed with the district court’s accommodations for those
who failed to plan ahead, and “as the Supreme Court observed last
April in this very case, voters who wait until the last minute face
problems with or without a pandemic.”153 Moreover, the Seventh
Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s refusal to allow federal judges to
respond to the pandemic in ways that should be left to other branches
of government.154 Looking to actions taken by the Court, the Seventh
Circuit likewise deferred to the judgment of elected officials.155
Citing a case from 1905, the Seventh Circuit maintained that
determinations about the best way to handle “difficulties caused by
disease” must substantially be handled by elected officials.156 The
Seventh Circuit previously relied on the implications of Jacobson v.
Massachusetts in a handful of other “decisions that have addressed
150

Id. at 642.
Id. (“The Supreme Court has held that the design of electoral procedures is a
legislative task.”); see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2484 (2019)
(holding “that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the
reach of the federal courts”).
152
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 642.
153
Id.
154
Id. (“The Court has consistently stayed orders by which federal judges have
used COVID-19 as a reason to displace the decisions of the policymaking branches
of government. It has stayed judicial orders about elections, prison management, and
the closure of businesses.”).
155
See id.
156
Id. at 643; see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
151
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requests for the Judicial Branch to supersede political officials’ choices
about how to deal with the pandemic.”157 Likewise, in this decision,
the Seventh Circuit refused to take judicial action to mitigate the
effects of the pandemic and therefore stayed the injunction issued by
the district court.158
WHY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT WAS WRONG
The Seventh Circuit’s October 8, 2020, opinion in Democratic
National Committee v. Bostelmann failed the citizens of Wisconsin.
Justice Rovner, dissenting, summarized it best: “This is a travesty.”159
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that “[t]he Justices have
deprecated but not forbidden all change close to an election. A lastminute event may require a last-minute reaction.”160 The Seventh
Circuit erred in determining that by waiting until September to take
action against the pandemic for the November election the district
court acted too late.161 As Justice Rovner explained, “[t]he Covid-19
pandemic is no longer new but neither is it a static phenomenon;
infection rates have ebbed and surged in multiple waves around the
country and it is only now that Wisconsin is facing crisis-level
conditions.”162
The framework developed through Supreme Court precedent
allows for some judicial intervention in elections when citizens’ rights
157
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 643; see, e.g., Tully v. Okeson, No.
20-2605, 977 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. Oct. 6, 2020) (regarding universal entitlement to
vote by mail during a pandemic); Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760
(7th Cir. 2020) (regarding size limits on political gatherings during the
pandemic); Peterson v. Barr, 965 F.3d 549 (7th Cir. 2020) (regarding execution
procedures during the pandemic); Morgan v. White, 964 F.3d 649 (7th Cir.
2020) (regarding rules for qualifying referenda for the ballot in light of social
distancing considerations); Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d
341 (7th Cir. 2020) (regarding the size of religious gatherings during the pandemic).
158
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 643.
159
Id. at 644 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
160
Id. at 642.
161
See id.
162
Id. at 646 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
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are burdened. The unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic
added a layer of complexity here. Decisions regarding election
protocols should not be left to the legislature in a time sensitive
situation such as this one. While the legislature may have the
institutional knowledge to shape elections, courts are reactive
institutions, equipped to move more quickly. One purpose of the
judicial branch and federal courts is to be able to intervene in
situations where time is of the essence; preliminary injunctions and
temporary restraining orders exist to provide relief for impending
harm.
“In the United States of America, a beacon of liberty founded on
the right of the people to rule themselves, no citizen should have to
choose between her health and her right to vote.” 163 As the public
health situation worsened in Wisconsin as fall began, the district court
took swift action to intervene, six weeks in advance of the election, in
order to protect the health of Wisconsin voters. The district court thus
relied upon a public health surveillance expert’s opinion “that ‘[t]here
is a significant risk to human health associated with in-person voting
during the COVID-19 pandemic[;] [t]here will almost certainly be a
significant risk of contracting and transmitting COVID-19 in
Wisconsin on and around November 3, 2020.’”164 He believed “[t]he
risk of contracting or transmitting COVID-19 will deter a substantial
portion of Wisconsinites from voting in person on November 3,
2020[;] and [i]ncreasing the ease and availability of absentee-ballot
voting options is critical to protecting public health during the
November 3, 2020 election.”165
Looking back to the April 2020 election, many Wisconsin voters
wished to vote absentee but, despite timely requests for absentee
ballots, over 100,000 voters did not receive their ballots in time to
return them by the election day deadline imposed by the Wisconsin
election code.166 Approximately “80,000 absentee ballots, their return
delayed by an overwhelmed election apparatus and Postal Service,
163

Id. at 643.
Id. at 651–52 (internal citations omitted).
165
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
166
Id. at 643.
164
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[were] rescued from the trash bin” solely because of judicial
intervention.167 Yet, thousands of other voters—those who never
received ballots in the mail—had to risk their health to vote in-person
on election day.168
Nearly three-fourths of Wisconsin voters cast absentee ballots in
the April 2020 election, but those voting in person faced significant
challenges.169 Given the severe shortage of poll workers, significantly
fewer polling cites opened in some locations:
Milwaukee, with a population of 592,025, normally operates
180 polling sites. The city could manage to open only five on
April 7. Green Bay, population 104,879, normally operates 31
polling sites. On April 7, just two were open. Lines of voters
(thousands of whom had timely applied for absentee ballots
but had not received them) stretched for blocks and people
waited hours to vote. Some were masked, many were not.
Some number of voters (we do not know how many) showed
up to vote in person after not receiving an absentee ballot
prior to election day and, discouraged by the long lines and
wait times, walked away without casting a vote. Those who
stayed in line faced a discernible risk of becoming infected.170
Those in-person voting complications were accompanied by health
consequences: “one analysis extrapolates from the available data to
estimate that a ten percent increase in in-person voters per polling
location is associated with an eighteen percent increase in Covid-19
cases two to three weeks later.” 171
Especially in light of the April 2020 election impact, the district
court appropriately weighed the burdens imposed on Wisconsinites’
voting rights and followed the Anderson-Burdick framework. As
Justice Rovner articulated, the Anderson-Burdick “framework does
167

Id.
Id.
169
Id. at 648–49.
170
Id. at 649 (internal citations omitted).
171
Id.
168
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call for deference to state officials, depending upon the degree of
restriction that state election rules impose on the right to vote: severe
restrictions demand strict judicial scrutiny, whereas modest,
unexceptional restrictions enjoy a presumption of validity.” 172 Justice
Rovner took issue with the majority’s complete deference to state
officials by failing to apply any degree of judicial scrutiny by
declaring “that ‘the design of adjustments during a pandemic’ is a task
for elected officials rather than the judiciary.”173 When state officials
fail to take action to prevent infringements on citizens’ ability to vote
before an upcoming election, judicial intervention becomes necessary.
Judge Conley, at the district level, carefully considered (1) “the
Wisconsin election rules in their totality in assessing the burdens that
those rules, under the present circumstances, impose[d] on the right to
vote,” (2) the Purcell caution to avoid disenfranchising voters by
taking judicial action too near an election, (3) the Seventh Circuit’s
April ruling which stayed all but two April modifications, and (4) the
Supreme Court’s April intervention in the case. 174 Moreover, “[i]n
view of the fact that this court allowed extensions of the ballot-request
deadline and ballot-receipt deadline to be implemented in the April
election, it [was] not clear to [Justice Rovner] why the majority . . .
decided to stay comparable modifications (effectively nullifying them)
for the November election.”175
“‘No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a
voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live.’ But the right to vote is the right to participate
in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the
integrity of the democratic system.”176 Whereas here, the severity of
the pandemic placed serious burdens on Wisconsinites’ ability to
exercise their right to vote, the district court appropriately modified
election procedures.
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As Justice Rovner noted, the WEC was represented in the
litigation below.177 The WEC (“whose members are appointed by the
Legislature and the Governor and are charged with administering the
State’s elections”) did not challenge the injunction nor complain about
any risk of voter confusion; “[o]nly the Wisconsin Legislature, which
has chosen to make no accommodations in the election rules to
account for the burdens created by the pandemic, seeks a stay of the
injunction in furtherance of its own power.”178 In considering
deference to state officials, the views of the WEC, “charged with
enforcing Wisconsin's election rules, ought to count for something.” 179
Division among state government officials should not interfere with
the right to vote; “no citizen of Wisconsin should be forced to risk his
or her life or well-being in order to exercise this invaluable right.
Wholesale deference to a state legislature in this context essentially
strips the right to vote of its constitutional protection.”180
As Justice Rovner articulated, “[t]he inevitable result of the
court’s decision today will be that many thousands of Wisconsin
citizens will lose their right to vote despite doing everything they
reasonably can to exercise it.”181 Rather than intervene to protect the
ability of Wisconsin citizens to participate in the election, “the court
declare[d] itself powerless to do anything.”182 However, the court’s
inaction was “inconsistent both with the stated rationale of Purcell and
with the Anderson-Burdick framework, which recognizes that courts
can and must intervene to address unacceptable burdens on the
fundamental right to vote.”183
The district court’s injunction complied with Purcell. “In all of
two sentences, Purcell articulated not a rule but a caution: take care
with last-minute changes to a state's election rules, lest voters become

177

Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 647 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
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confused and discouraged from voting.”184 But the Supreme Court’s
recent shadow docket decisions have failed to flesh out the Purcell
doctrine.185 Purcell—and the subsequent line of Supreme Court
shadow docket rulings that have followed—have created a
presumption preventing judicial intervention near an election. 186
However, the so-called Purcell doctrine fails to address many
important questions including “how near? As to what types of
changes? Overcome by what showing?”187 Moreover, “the Supreme
Court’s pattern of staying similar sorts of injunctions in recent months
is long on signaling but short on concrete principles that lower courts
can apply to the specific facts before them.” 188 Unless and until the
Supreme Court provides guidance beyond simply Purcell’s caution
and “an occasional sentence or two in its stay rulings,” lower courts
must “carefully evaluate emergent circumstances that threaten to
interfere with the right to vote and conscientiously evaluate all of the
factors that bear on the propriety of judicial intervention to address
those circumstances, including in particular the possibility of voter
confusion.”189
Justice Rovner advocated for consideration of five factors to
determine whether courts should intervene to modify election rules.190
Those factors supported the intervention undertaken here by the
district court.191 First, voter confusion resulting from modifications
must be considered.192 As Justice Rovner asserted, “[t]hat risk is
minimal here” because “[o]nly two of the five modifications that
Judge Conley ordered alter what is expected of voters: the extension of
the deadline to register online or by mail, and the extension of the

184
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deadline for receipt of absentee ballots.” 193 Extending deadlines would
hardly create confusion among voters, but any voter confused about a
deadline could always comply with the earlier deadline without
missing any opportunity to vote. Indeed, “[b]oth of these
modifications redound to the benefit of voters, and certainly d[id] not
lay a trap for the unwary.”
Second, courts must consider the possibility that changes to
election rules will increase the likelihood of mistakes or burden
election officials.194 Judge Conley gave this factor careful
consideration and rightly concluded adequate time existed to
implement the modifications and “[t]he Wisconsin Election
Commission signaled a preparedness and ability to comply with these
modifications . . . , and the State Executive [was] not here to contend
otherwise.”195
Third, courts must weigh the likelihood of resulting voter
disenfranchisement.196 The actions taken by the district court in this
case would not have resulted in voter disenfranchisement; they were
taken precisely to prevent disenfranchisement. 197 On the contrary,
failing to enact the proposed modifications would result in
disenfranchisement, as indicated by the April election.198
Fourth, the plaintiffs did not lack diligence in seeking relief.199
The plaintiffs sought relief in April before the primary election and
renewed their efforts following that election. 200 Plaintiffs have
diligently sought relief, beginning well in advance of the November
election: “[a]fter they defeated the Legislature’s attempt to dismiss
their claims, they proceeded with discovery, presented their case at an
evidentiary hearing in August, and obtained a favorable ruling in
September. There has been no dallying on the plaintiffs’ part.”201
193
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Plaintiffs who seek intervention well before an election—especially in
circumstances like a pandemic where further foresight was
impossible—should not be barred from relief. As Justice Rovner
underscored, “according to this court, which has retroactively
announced a May deadline for any changes to election rules, it was all
for naught—their work was over before it began.”202
The fifth and final consideration involves timing. 203 Here, “the
district judge issued his injunction six weeks prior to the election,
leaving ample time for Wisconsin election officials to alter election
practices as ordered and communicate the changes to the public, and
for his judgment to be reviewed by this court and, if necessary, by the
Supreme Court.”204 The virus had progressed since the Supreme Court
decision in April205 and the district court provided different relief in
this stage of the case. To say the same result should have followed
here applied defunct reasoning, especially given that here the timeline
was different than in April. In April, the district court’s injunction
came on March 28, only eighteen days before the election, and was
modified, granting additional relief, only five days in advance of the
election.206 Here, the district court acted six weeks in advance of the
election and four weeks in advance of the first deadline it changed. 207
Importantly, “[n]othing in Purcell or its progeny forecloses
modifications of the kind the district court ordered in the worsening
circumstances that confront Wisconsin as the election draws nigh.
Otherwise, courts would never be able to order relief addressing latedeveloping circumstances that threaten interference with the right to
vote.”208
CONCLUSION
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(2020).
206
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 977 F.3d at 644 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
207
See id.
208
Id.
203

120

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/5

32

Williams: "Democracy is Not a Spectator Sport": A Case for Necessary Judici

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

The fundamental right to vote must be protected. Under the
Anderson-Burdick framework created by the Supreme Court, burdens
on the right to vote must be weighed against the state’s interests
supporting restrictions. In light of this precedent, judicial intervention
was appropriate to protect Wisconsin citizens’ right to vote given the
worsening pandemic conditions leading up to the November election.
Heeding Purcell’s caution against confusing voters with judicial
intervention too near an election, the district court acted carefully to
ease the burdens placed on Wisconsinites by the pandemic weeks
ahead of the election. The Seventh Circuit should not have prevented
the necessary judicial intervention in the Wisconsin election. Justice
Rovner’s closing remarks highlighted the severity of the court’s
inaction: “[g]ood luck and G-d bless, Wisconsin. You are going to
need it.”209
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